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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The topic of this paper is the problem of opaque attitude contexts in philosophy of 
language. I will analyze the mainstream strategy for solving the problem and present 
some criticism against it. My aim is to open up possibilities for alternative accounts that 
may prove more efficient in treating this problem. I will develop one such alternative in 
this paper, and compare it to the mainstream strategy. 
Roughly characterized, the problem is that sentences reporting propositional attitudes of 
individuals seem to behave in ways that conflict with one of the basic assumptions 
about how language works. The assumption is that the truth value of a propositional 
attitude report, like that of any other declarative sentence, should be a function of the 
values of its constituent expressions and their syntactic combination. In section 2 of this 
paper I will explain why this assumption is held, and how the conflict between it and 
propositional attitude reporting sentences arises. 
The mainstream strategy for solving the conflict has been to treat the meanings of some 
of the constituents of propositional attitude reports as contributions to truth value. I refer 
to this strategy as propositionalism. I will give an overview of propositionalism in 
section 3, and introduce some criticism against both the soundness of this strategy and 
the need for considering it in section 4. Criticism against the soundness of 
propositionalism derives from the works of Charles Travis, and criticism against the 
need for it from the works of Lynne Rudder Baker and Bruno Mölder. 
Finally, I will draw an outline of an alternative approach to solving the problem, that 
takes the shortcomings of propositionalism into consideration. I refer to this alternative 
as the model theory of propositional attitudes and it is the topic of section 5 of this 
paper. The last section of the paper is dedicated to comparing the model theory with 
propositionalism, and to showing that it can account for the problems the latter has, and 
is just as effective in solving the problems the latter solves. As a bonus, because of the 
new take it has on propositional attitude reports, it has some interesting implications to 
epistemology, which I will explain at the end of the final section. 
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2. ALETHIC COMPOSITIONALITY AND THE OPACITY OF 
ATTITUDE CONTEXTS 
 
The purpose of this section is twofold. I will introduce the problem that will guide the 
discussion throughout the paper, namely the problem of opaque attitude contexts, but, 
while doing this, I will also introduce a large part of the terminology that I need in this 
paper. The section divides into two thematic parts. The first part (2.1‒2.2) builds up to 
the problem ‒ there I introduce the principle of alethic compositionality and points 
related to it ‒, and the second part (2.3) is on the problem itself. 
 
2.1. Introduction to some basics notions of syntax 
 
A language generally has a set of atomic expressions ‒ its vocabulary ‒ and a set of 
grammar rules for combining elements of the vocabulary into complex expressions. 
From the set of possible atomic expressions, I will restrict my discussion to names and 
predicates (non-logical atomic expressions), and some logical operators. The kind of 
complex expressions I will be looking at in this paper are declarative sentences (from 
now on ‘sentences’ for short). 
Given that competent speakers of any language have the ability, in principle, to 
recognize an infinity of combinations of atomic expressions as sentences, and to 
distinguish them from combinations that are not sentences, the set of atomic expressions 
and the set of grammar rules of any language, must both be finite. Only then can this 
ability be learned in a finite time. 
To clarify certain points in the discussion that follows, I will need to define a simple 
language   that only has names, one-place predicates of English1, and a logical operator 
‘ ’ (that reads ‘is identical with’ or ‘is the same as’) in its vocabulary. 
 
                                                 
1
 Names and one-place predicates, e.g. ‘green’, are usually connected with the copula ‘is’. Since I’m not 
discussing anything specifically related to the copula, I will omit it from the formal definitions, but I will 
keep it in the examples for readability. 
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Grammar rules of   
(i) If   is a name, and   is a one-place predicate, then      is a sentence of  . 
(ii) If   and   are both names, or both one-place predicates, then       is a sentence of  . 
(iii) Nothing else is a sentence of  . 
I will be referring to forms like ‘  ’ and ‘   ’ as grammatical structures of 
sentences. 
 
2.2. Introduction to alethics 
 
A widely held assumption in philosophy of language is that meaning can be understood, 
in some way or other, in terms of truth (e.g. Davidson 1967). Because of this, the 
distinction between what expressions contribute to the meanings of sentences they occur 
in, and what they contribute to their truth values, has become blurred. They are often 
both referred to as contents of expressions. Since in subsequent sections I will be 
discussing some issues concerning the relations between the two, I will separate the two 
notions to avoid equivocation. I will be referring to contributions to meanings as 
semantic values, and to contributions to truth values as alethic values.
2
 
 
2.2.1. Alethic values of non-logical atomic expressions 
 
Alethic values of names and predicates (or any other non-logical atomic expressions
3
) 
can be formally represented by constructing a model. To keep the formalism simple, I 
will use extensional models throughout this paper. An extensional model is composed 
of a domain, which is a set of object, and an interpretation function, which is a function 
that assigns alethic values to non-logical atomic expressions. 
                                                 
2
 It might be worth noting that most of what formal semantics is concerned with ends up being on the side 
of alethics, not semantics. 
 
3
 The alethic values of logical operators are the effects they have to the alethic values of complex 
expressions they are constituents of. For this reason they don’t need to be assigned alethic values by an 
interpretation function, instead they are defined with the help of the valuation function (see 2.2.3). 
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A model  for   
       , where   is a set of objects; and   is the following function: 
(iv) if   is a name, then       . 
(v) if   is a one-place predicate, then       . 
In an extensional model, the alethic values of expressions are extensions. Extensions of 
sentences are truth values, which are the topic of the next two subsections. 
 
2.2.2. Alethic compositionality 
 
Just as competent speakers have learned in a finite time the ability to recognize, in 
principle, for an infinity of combinations of atomic expressions whether or not they are 
sentences, they have also learned in a finite time the ability to evaluate each sentence in 
the light of what state they take the world to be in, and to determine on that basis 
whether or not a given sentence is true. This means that truth values of sentences can 
only depend on the alethic values of their constituents plus the way these constituents 
are combined (the grammatical structure). This is the principle of alethic 
compositionality. 
The Principle of Alethic Compositionality 
For any declarative sentence  : the alethic value of   depends only on the alethic values of 
the constituents of  , and the grammatical structure of  . 
For example, if I am suitably informed about the world, know the grammar rules of 
English, and I know how ‘Mary’, ‘the father of’, and ‘is rich’ get their alethic values, 
then I can already decide whether ‘Mary is rich’, ‘the father of Mary is rich’, ‘the father 
of the father of Mary is rich’, etc, are true or not. In order for this reasoning to apply, the 
principle of alethic compositionality must work without exceptions. 
 
2.2.3. Truth-condition schemas 
 
The way truth values of sentences are determined on the basis of the alethic values of 
their constituents and the grammatical structures can be represented by defining a 
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function that assigns a truth value to every sentence relative to a model. This function ‒ 
the valuation function ‒ must have constraints that guarantee that each grammatical 
structure would entail one specific way of determining a truth value. These constraints 
can be explicated by writing out biconditionals for every grammatical structure in the 
language. The language   has two grammatical structures, so we must write out two 
biconditionals when defining the valuation function. 
The valuation function    for   
   is a function, relative to an  -model , that is subject to the following constraints: 
(vi) if   is a name, and   is a one-place predicate, then 
 (T
1
)         true if, and only if (iff)          . 
(vii) if   and   are both names, or both one-place predicates, then 
 (T
2
)          true iff          . 
These biconditionals are sometimes referred to as truth-condition schemas. They are 
hypotheses about when competent speakers of a language will count a sentence with 
such-and-such grammatical structure as true, given that the speakers are in suitable 
conditions for making the judgment (not distracted, decieved, etc). When the schemas 
are filled out with specific atomic expressions with their respective alethic values, we 
get the hypothetical truth-conditions of sentences. The truth-conditions of a sentence are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the sentence is true. 
 
2.2.4. Alethic substitutivity 
 
The principle of alethic compositionality entails that any two expressions with the same 
alethic value are substitutable in a sentence without altering its truth value. This is the 
principle of alethic substitutivity. 
The Principle of Alethic Substitutivity 
If   is a sentence, and   is a constituent of  , then, if we substitute   with its alethic 
equivalent   , resulting in   , the alethic values of   and    are the same. 
An important point about substitutivity is that given that compositionality entails 
substitutivity, it is in virtue of contraposition that any counterexample to the latter is a 
counterexample to the former. 
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Before introducing possible counterexamples, I will illustrate how the compositionality 
and substitutivity principles work. Assume that the following two sentences of   are 
true: 
 (1) Superman is flying. 
 (2) Superman   Clark Kent. 
From (2) and the truth-condition schema (T
2) we can conclude that ‘Superman’ and 
‘Clark Kent’ have the same alethic value. From (1), the truth-condition schema (T1), and 
the principle of alethic substitutivity we can now conclude that the following sentence 
must be true: 
 (3) Clark Kent is flying. 
This seems to be the right result. The same can be said about predicates. Consider the   
sentences (4) and (5). 
 (4) Clark Kent is a journalist. 
 (5) A journalist   a reporter. 
The principle of alethic substitutivity forces us to predict that given the truth-condition 
schemas (T
1
) and (T
2
), insofar as the sentences (4) and (5) are true, so is (6). 
 (6) Clark Kent is a reporter. 
This prediction seems to be accurate as well. 
 
2.3. Opacity of the attitude context 
 
Sentences that report attitudes of individuals seem to pose a problem for alethic 
substitutivity. Attitude reports can be divided into two broad categories ‒ propositional 
and non-propositional attitude reports. Throughout this paper I will be discussing the 
former. 
Propositional attitude reports are sentences composed of a noun-phrase, a propositional 
attitude verb (often together with the complementizer ‘that’), and an embedded 
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subclause, as in ‘Lois believes that Superman is flying’.4 In addition to ‘believes’, 
propositional attitude verbs include ‘hopes’, ‘thinks’, ‘doubts’, ‘suspects’, etc, and they 
can be viewed together with ‘says’, ‘sees’, ‘guesses’, and other verbs that take 
subclauses. I will refer to a complex of words of the form ‘   ’s that …’ where   is a 
noun-phrase, and   is a propositional attitude verb, as the attitude context. (Words that 
occur in the place of the three dots are inside the attitude context.)
5
 
The problem that I am addressing is that alethic substitutivity within attitude context 
seems to fail. Following Quine (1961), this feature is referred to as opacity. 
The discovery that names seem to behave differently when inside the attitude context 
has been attributed to Gottlob Frege (1997 (Orig. 1892)). This is probably the most 
widely discussed property of the attitude context, and goes also by the name ‘Frege’s 
puzzle’ (McKay, Nelson 2010). Consider the propositional attitude report (7) and the 
identity claim (2) from before: 
 (7) Lois believes that Superman is flying. 
 (2) Superman   Clark Kent. 
As before, (2) and the truth-condition schema (T
2
) guarantee that the alethic values of 
the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are the same. According to the principle of 
alethic substitutivity, given the truth of (2), if the propositional attitude report (7) is true, 
the following must be true as well: 
 (8) Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying. 
Intuitively, however, (7) and (2) can be true without entailing the truth of (8).
6
 This in 
turn means that the principle of alethic substitutivity seems to fail in this case, and thus 
                                                 
4
 Non-propositional attitude reports are those where the attitude verb is not followed by a full sentence, 
but rather a to-construction, as in ‘Lois wants to meet Superman’. They, unlike propositional attitude 
reports, can be used to express aims and intents (see Baier 1970). 
 
5
 The formal definition for the grammar of propositional attitude reports will be given in the next section. 
It should be noted for the present discussion that the subclause of the report is a sentence of  . 
 
6
 To say that (7) and (2) can be true without entailing the truth of (8), might require some clarification. 
What it means is that (7) and (2) can be true while (8) is false, but, when discussing the falsity of (8), it is 
sometimes taken to entail that ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent is not flying’ is true. This is a mistake. What 
the falsity of (8) entails is that ‘it’s not the case that Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying’ is true. It is a 
denial of the existence of a certain attitude, not a claim that there is an opposite attitude. 
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the principle of alethic compositionality seems to fail as well. The same appears to be 
true about predicates, as in: 
 (10) Lois believes that Clark Kent is a journalist. 
 (5)  A journalist   a reporter. 
 (11) Lois believes that Clark Kent is a reporter. 
It seems that (10) and (5) can be true, without (11) being true, even though the principle 
of alethic substitutivity forces us to say otherwise. 
Given that the principle of alethic compositionality is required to explain the linguistic 
competence of speakers, we cannot accept these results. An ideal way to overcome this 
problem would be to provide a truth-condition schema for propositional attitude reports 
that also solves the problem of opacity of the attitude context, preserving the principle 
of alethic substitutivity. 
In the next section I will introduce the mainstream theory about what this truth-
condition schema should look like, and two different views within the mainstream 
theory ‒ the Fregean and the Russellian view ‒ about how this schema accounts for the 
problem of the opacity of attitude contexts. 
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3. PROPOSITIONALISM 
 
In this section I will introduce propositionalism, which has been the main departure 
point for attempts at solving the problem of opaque attitude contexts. The purpose of 
this section is not just to give an overview of the theory but to explicate some of the 
underlying assumptions that come with it, so that they can be subjected to criticism in 
the next section. For this reason, I will slide over some of the details that may have high 
significance for propositionalists themselves. I will start by giving a short overview of 
what propositions are. I will then explain what it means to be a propositionalist, and 
which truth-condition schema she proposes for propositional attitude reports ‒ this will 
be the topic of subsection 3.2. In 3.3 I will give an overview of what could have led 
philosophers to accept this theory. In the final two subsections I will give a brief 
overview of the two main varieties of propositionalism, namely the Fregean and the 
Russellian view, and go through their responses to the problem of opacity. 
 
3.1. What are propositions? 
 
There is a sense in which an English sentence ‘snow is white’, and an Estonian sentence 
‘lumi on valge’ are both expressing the same thing, even though they are composed of 
different words. That one thing they are expressing is the proposition, namely the 
proposition that snow is white. Propositions are the semantic values of sentences ‒ what 
the sentences mean. Just like alethic values of sentences, propositions must also be 
determined compositionally ‒ which proposition is expressed by a sentence is 
determined only by the semantic values of the constituents and the grammatical 
structure of the sentence. Only then can competent speakers have the ability to 
understand more sentences than they could have learned.
7
 
                                                 
7
 The following point about understanding is worth re-stating: one can understand a sentence without 
knowing the truth value of the sentence. So, whatever the proposition that   is, it cannot be something 
such that knowing it entails knowing the truth value of   (unless, perhaps, when   is a logical truth). 
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Propositions are also taken to have truth values. To say something true is to assert a true 
proposition, and to say something false is to assert a false proposition.
8
 Given that 
propositions are the semantic values of sentences, this makes them truth-bearers without 
syntax. In order to avoid conflict with the principle of alethic compositionality, 
propositions are taken to have structures that mirror the grammatical structures of 
sentences. This results in propositions being ordered  -tuples of semantic values.9 E.g. 
the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Superman is flying’ is an ordered pair where 
the first element is the semantic value of ‘Superman’ and the second element is the 
semantic value of ‘flying’. 
 
3.2. Overview of propositionalism 
 
What I call propositionalism, is the theory according to which 
making true or false assertions is not the only thing we do with propositions. We also bear 
cognitive attitudes toward them. Propositions are what we believe, disbelieve, or suspend 
our judgment about. When you fear that you will fail or hope that you will succeed, when 
you venture a guess or feel certain about something, the object of your attitude is a 
proposition. (Salmon, Soames 1988: 1) 
Propositionalism is therefore a theory about the role of propositions in our mental lives. 
It states that i) there are objects of attitudes, and ii) these objects are propositions. 
The propositionalist proposal for the truth-condition schema for propositional attitude 
reports is based on the idea that propositional attitude reports express relations between 
individuals and propositions ‒ the individual has an attitude (believing, fearing, hoping, 
etc) towards the proposition. The proposition the individual is said to stand in, say, the 
believing relation to, is expressed by the subclause of the propositional attitude report. 
So, the purpose of the subclause is to pick out the right proposition. 
                                                 
8
 Opinions vary with respect to whether sentences should be taken to inherit their truth values from 
propositions, or vice versa. In what follows, the answer to this question is irrelevant. All that matters is 
that the sentence   and the proposition that   never differ in truth value. 
 
9
 There is a view according to which „[a] proposition is a function from possible worlds into truth-
values“, and thus do not mirror the structure of sentences (Stalnaker 1987: 2; italics omitted). Due to the 
limits of space, I will not be discussing this view in more detail here, although some of what I am saying 
in this paper (section 4) also applies to it. For a detailed criticism of this view, see Soames 1988. 
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The propositionalist proposal is then that the alethic value (the extension) of the attitude 
verb should be treated as a binary relation over a set of individuals and a set of 
propositions. I take it that the object of a propositional attitude is therefore the alethic 
value of the subclause of the propositional attitude report, which, for a propositionalist, 
is a proposition. I will illustrate this with an example. Consider the following sentence 
again: 
 (1) Lois believes that Superman is flying. 
According to propositionalism, the sentence (1) is true if, and only if Lois is standing in 
the believing-relation to the proposition expressed by the subclause ‘Superman is 
flying’. Lois’s belief is true if, and only if the proposition expressed by the subclause is 
true. 
To illustrate this in more formal terms, I will upgrade the language   from before into 
  , which is just like  , except it also has propositional attitude verbs in its vocabulary, 
and a set of propositions as a constituent of its model. Following Heim and Kratzer 
(2007), I will treat the complementizer ‘that’ as semantically vacuous, omitting it not 
only from the semantics but, for clarity, also from the formal syntax. For readability, I 
will keep using it in the examples. For any sentence  , I will use       to denote the 
proposition that  . 
Grammar rules of    
(i) All sentences of   are sentences of   . 
(ii) If   is a name,   is a propositional attitude verb, and   is a sentence of   , then       
is a sentence of   . 
(iii) Nothing else is a sentence of   . 
A model  for    
         , where   is a set of propositions,   is a non-empty set, and   is an 
interpretation function that is just like the interpretation function of an  -model, except for 
the following addition: 
(iv) if   is a propositional attitude verb, then         . 
The valuation function    for    
   is a function, relative to an   -model , that is just like the  -valuation function, except 
for the following addition: 
(v) if   is a sentence of   ,   is a name, and   is a propositional attitude verb, then 
 (T
3
)          true iff        true. 
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 (T
4
)          true iff                . 
Independently of what the propositionalist takes to be the constituents of the 
proposition, (T
4
) is what she proposes as the truth-condition schema for propositional 
attitude reports. The truth-condition schema (T
3
) guarantees that the truth of the 
subclause of the attitude report entails the truth of the object of the attitude. The 
propositionalist needs this entailment because of the assumption that the role of the 
subclause is to pick out the proposition that the individual is related to. 
 
3.3. The motivation for propositionalism 
 
The main motivation for the first assumption of propositionalism, namely that there are 
objects of attitudes, seems to become salient when we look at expressions that are used 
alongside propositional attitude reports. For example, we say things like ‘Lois Lane 
believes that Superman is flying, and Lex Luthor believes it too’, and ‘there is 
something that Lois Lane and Lex Luthor both believe’. Both sentences seem to be 
truth-apt and not at all uncommon in ordinary speech. What is important here is that in 
both cases we use the kind of expressions that we normally use when we talk about 
objects. In order to study the alethics of propositional attitude reports, we must take this 
into account. Postulating objects of attitudes into the truth-conditions is the 
propositionalist way of doing this. 
The motivation for the second assumption of propositionalism, namely that these 
objects are propositions, stems from the following observations. First, our beliefs, 
suspicions, thoughts, etc, seem to be such that they can be true or false, right or wrong, 
correct or incorrect. E.g. we say things like ‘Mary suspects that someone’s been stealing 
her cigarettes, and she’s right’, ‘John thinks that everyone is out to get him, and its true, 
everyone is out to get him’, ‘Mr Smith correctly assumes that the man who gets the job 
has ten coins in his pocket’. The propositionalist takes this to be evidence that objects of 
propositional attitudes should be treated as truth-apt. This limits the search for these 
objects to the subclause of the propositional attitude report ‒ the truth value of the report 
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can only depend on the alethic values of its constituents, and the only constituent that 
could itself carry a truth value, is the subclause. 
Second, although truth-apt, it seems that these objects cannot have as constituents any 
of the syntactic elements of the subclause. We can, for example, use English to report 
the attitudes of people who do not speak English, and it seems that we can even report 
attitudes of someone who doesn’t speak any language (Moore 1995: section 5.4). E.g. 
when my cat, seeing me taking a can of catfood off the shelf, runs to her bowl, it seems 
we are justified in saying that she believes that she will be fed. If so, then, when I put 
the can back, we can say that what she believes is false. Furthermore, we can share 
attitudes with someone who doesn’t speak the language we speak, or any other language 
for that matter ‒ e.g. ‘Mary knows that the Earth is bigger than Mars, and Mari, a non-
English speaker, knows it too’, ‘me and my cat thought that someone was at the door’. 
This, together with the truth-aptness requirement seems to make propositions the only 
available candidates for the objects of attitudes. 
These (and perhaps other) considerations have led the majority of philosophers to accept 
propositionalism. There is, however, a lot of disagreement on what these truth-apt, 
structured, sentence-like entities that have no syntax, that figure as semantic values of 
sentences, and towards which we bear cognitive attitudes, should be taken to be 
composed of. I will now look at two main views on it. 
 
3.4. The Fregean and the Russellian view of propositions 
 
There are two mainstream views on what the constituents of propositions are: the 
Fregean view and the Russellian view. Frege (1997 (Orig. 1892)) drew a distinction 
between the sense (Sinn) and the reference (Bedeutung) of an expression. The reference 
of an expression, on Frege’s view, is an alethic value. The sense of an expression is 
what determines its reference. Frege writes: 
The regular connection between a sign [an expression], its sense, and its Bedeutung is of 
such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite 
Bedeutung, while to a given Bedeutung (an object) there does not belong only a single sign 
(Frege 1997: 153). 
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From this it follows that two expressions with the same reference can have different 
senses, but two expressions with the same sense, will also have the same reference. 
According to the Fregean view of propositions, the constituents of the proposition that 
  are the senses of the constituents of  . I will refer to these propositions as Fregean 
propositions. (Frege himself used the term ‘thought’ for this). Since sentences are also 
expressions, they also have a sense and a reference. The sense of   is the Fregean 
proposition that  , and the reference of   is a truth value. 
In the 1904 correspondence with Frege, Bertrand Russell writes: 
I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is 
actually asserted in … ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 metres high’. We do not assert the 
thought, for this is a private psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and 
this is, to my mind, a certain complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in which 
Mont Blanc is itself a component part. (Selection 1988: 57) 
This is known as the Russellian view on the nature of propositions. The Russellian view 
differs from the Fregean view in that it denies the existence of senses, and takes the 
constituents of the proposition that   to be the referents of the constituents of  . I will 
refer to these propositions as Russellian propositions. One consequence of taking the 
semantic values of sentences to be Russellian propositions is that they will be less finely 
individuated ‒ if two sentences   and   have the same grammatical structure, and the 
constituents of   are co-referring with the constituents of  , then, unlike the Fregean, 
the Russellian is forced to say that     and     are the same proposition. Another 
consequence is that, unlike the Fregean, the Russellian must treat the reference of an 
expression as a semantic value. (Due to semantic compositionality, a proposition, being 
a complex semantic value, can only have semantic values as constituents.) The 
Russellian takes the semantic values of names to be objects, and the semantic values of 
one-place predicates to be properties. Alethic values of expressions are then defined in 
terms of their semantic values. Alethic values of names are their semantic values, and 
alethic values of one-place predicates are sets of objects that instantiate the properties 
that are their semantic values. This makes alethic compositionality depend on semantic 
compositionality ‒ the alethic value of a sentence (a truth value) is, in the end, 
determined only by its grammatical structure and the semantic values of its constituents. 
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3.5. The Fregean and the Russellian response to the problem of opacity 
 
Like all propositionalists the Fregean and the Russellian propositionalists accept the 
truth-condition schema (T
4
). Their responses to the problem of opaque attitude contexts 
differ because of the differences in what they take the nature of propositions to be. I will 
go through both responses. 
Let’s take the example with names from before (responses to this are also responses to 
the example with predicates). 
 (1) Lois believes that Superman is flying. 
 (2) Superman   Clark Kent. 
 (3) Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying. 
The problem was that intuitively, (1) and (2) can be true, while (3) is false, which would 
contradict the principle of alethic compositionality. 
The Fregean propositionalist response to the problem is the following. Although the 
alethic values of sentences are truth values, what (T
4
) says, is that within an attitude 
context, the alethic value of the sentence   is the Fregean proposition that  . From this 
and the principle of alethic compositionality we can then conclude that the alethic 
values of the constituents of   within attitude context are the constituents of the Fregean 
proposition that  . In other words, when within attitude context, expressions contribute 
their senses to the truth value of the propositional attitude report, not their references. 
The truth of (2) entails that the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ have the same 
reference, but they can still have different senses. So, according to the Fregean 
propositionalist, the intuition that the propositional attitude reports (1) and (3) differ in 
truth value is correct, but since ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ in (1) and (3) occur within 
an attitude context, their alethic values differ, and the principle of alethic substitutivity 
is therefore not violated. 
The Russellian propositionalist view was developed in order to account for various 
problems with the Fregean view, mostly originating from the fact that it requires names 
to have senses (Kripke 1988, Richard 1988). For the Russellian propositionalist, (T
4
) 
also says that the sentence   (and, therefore, also its constituents) within attitude 
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context contributes its semantic value to the truth value of the propositional attitude 
report. However, since Russellian alethic values are defined in terms of semantic values, 
shifting from one to the other will not save alethic substitutivity. The Russellian 
propositionalist response to the problem of opacity is that our intuition that (1) and (3) 
can differ in truth value, is simply wrong. The reason why it seems that the truth values 
of (1) and (3) can differ, is that we are confusing semantics with pragmatics. This idea is 
based on Paul Grice’s view of pragmatics according to which there are conditions of 
appropriateness for expressions, such that to use the expression in the absence of these 
conditions would be misleading, but that this would not affect the truth value of what is 
said (Grice 1991: 9). 
For example, it is true but inappropriate to utter the sentence ‘John is sober today’ if one 
knows that John is always sober. Uttering that sentence is misleading because it suggests a 
contrast where there is none. But that doesn't make it false. (McKay, Nelson 2010) 
The Russellian propositionalist attempts to explain opacity away by claiming that even 
though (1) and (3) say the same thing (and thus also have the same alethic values), the 
utterance of (3) creates the impression that Lois recognizes that the sentence ‘Clark 
Kent is flying’ expresses the proposition she believes. This makes (3) a misleading way 
of reporting Lois’s belief, but not a false sentence.10 
The Russellian view also has problems. For example, attitude reports are usually taken 
to convey potential for explaning and predicting the subject’s behaviour. (1) and (3), 
however, do not share their explanatory and predictive potential (McKay, Nelson 2010). 
Also, as Stephen Schiffer (1987) has pointed out, if we attribute to someone who is 
aware of the fact that Superman is Clark Kent the belief that (1) is true and (3) is false 
(as we seem to do to ourselves for example), then the Russellian propositionalist is 
forced to say that we are then attributing a belief that a contradiction is true, which 
would violate certain minimal constraints on rationality. 
In this section I introduced the notion of a proposition and explained what I mean by 
propositionalism. I then gave an overview of what I believe are the reasons that have led 
people into accepting the propositionalist theory. Finally, I gave a short overview of two 
                                                 
10
 Another, similar strategy that some Russellians, e.g. John Perry (1988), have taken, is to draw a 
distinction between the proposition believed, and a way of believing the proposition ‒ a belief state. This 
helps to explain how a subject can have contradicting beliefs, but not how someone could believe and, at 
the same time, not believe a proposition, which is what I am concerned with in this paper. 
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different widely held views on the nature of propositions ‒ Fregeanism and 
Russellianism ‒, and showed how the problem of opaque attitude contexts is dealt in 
each camp. 
In the next section I will introduce a Travisian objection against both the Fregean and 
the Russellian propositionalist view, showing that they share a common problem that 
arises from the truth-condition schemas they propose. I will also show possible ways 
out of the considerations that have led philosophers into proposing these schemas. 
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4. OBJECTIONS TO THE ADEQUACY AND NECESSITY OF 
PROPOSITIONALISM 
 
My aim in this section is to show that propositionalism as such is not without problems, 
and that adopting propositionalism is not necessary. In other words, my aim is to show 
that alternatives to propositionalism are both desirable and possible. I will do this by 
first presenting a direct objection against propositionalism, and then showing that a lot 
of what has motivated philosophers to accept propositionalism, can be bypassed. The 
objection I am presenting has been developed by Charles Travis, and concerns the 
occasion sensitivity of propositional attitude reports. This is the theme of subsection 4.1. 
In subsection 4.2 I will show how we can avoid the assumption that propositional 
attitudes are truth-apt and the requirement that objects of attitudes cannot have syntactic 
constituents. In the next section I will use these ideas to develop an outline of an 
alternative to propositionalism. 
 
4.1. A Travisian objection to the adequacy of propositionalism 
 
Charles Travis is a critic of the Davidsonian theory of meaning according to which 
meanings of sentences can be understood in terms of their truth-conditions (see 2.2). 
The position Travis holds is that a sentence, any sentence, with one meaning can have 
different truth-conditions on different occasions of utterance. I will explain his position 
in terms introduced already in this paper. 
Expressions have two kinds of properties, alethic and semantic properties. An alethic 
property is the property of having something as an alethic value (e.g. as an extension). 
A semantic property is the property of having something as a semantic value. The view 
Travis holds is that it is not possible to fix alethic properties of an expression by fixing 
its semantic properties, nor vice versa. If one of the properties are kept fixed, then the 
other ones can always vary. Although he doesn’t seem to have a conclusive argument 
for this claim, Travis does present evidence for it. The way he does this is by means of 
thought-experiments like the following: 
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Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is the colour of leaves, 
she paints them. Returning, she reports, ‘That’s better. The leaves are green now.’ She 
speaks truth. A botanist friend then phones, seeking green leaves for a study of green-leaf 
chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are green,’ Pia says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia 
speaks falsehood. (Travis 2008b: 111) 
The semantic properties of ‘the leaves are green’ remain invariant across both occasions 
of utterance ‒ the words ‘are green’ are for calling things green, and ‘the leaves’ are for 
speaking of one and the same leaves. However, the truth value of ‘the leaves are green’ 
changes (while the leaves in question don’t), indicating that the alethic properties of ‘the 
leaves are green’ must be varying from one occasion to another. (Travis 2008b: 
111‒112) 
A Travisian objection to propositionalism can now be stated. Consider the following 
propositional attitude report: 
 (1) Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying. 
Let us keep the semantic properties of its subclause ‘Clark Kent is flying’ fixed. So it 
will express the same proposition on different occasions of utterance. What (T
4
) forces 
us to accept now is that, whenever (1) is true, Lois is related believingly to one and the 
same object ‒ the proposition that Clark Kent is flying. Given (T3), the truth value of the 
subclause on one occasion of utterance of (1) will be the truth value of the object of 
Lois’s attitude on every occasion of utterance of (1). 
If Travis is right about the relation between semantic and alethic properties, then it 
should be possible to construct thought-experiments in which the following can be 
observed. Uttering (1) on two different occasions, both in which (1) is true, i) the 
proposition expressed by the subclause of (1) doesn’t change, meaning that Lois is 
related believingly to one and the same object on both occasions (because of (T
4
)), but 
ii) the truth value of the object of Lois’s attitude changes, contradicting (T3). 
Here’s one such thought-experiment (in it, we are the speakers of (1)). Suppose Lois, 
after finding out that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person, sees something 
flying high above Metropolis, and she forms the belief that Clark Kent is flying. It 
happes to be that what Lois is seeing is actually a plane, and so her belief is false. So 
what we have is the following: 
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 (2) Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying, and her belief is false. 
Suppose further that Lois’s (and Clark Kent’s) boss at The Daily Planet calls her later, 
and says that Clark Kent’s plane will land in Moscow in an hour. Lois then forms the 
belief that Clark Kent is flying. What Lois now believes is true. (We may assume that 
Clark Kent is on that exact plane that Lois was looking at before.) From this we can 
conclude the following: 
 (3) Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying, and her belief is true. 
The semantic values of the subclauses in (2) and (3) are the same ‒ ‘Clark Kent’ is used 
to speak of one and the same Clark Kent, also ‘is flying’ in both sentences is used to 
speak of being on a way from point A to point B without touching the ground between 
them. So, according to (T
4
) Lois is related to one and the same proposition. The 
semantic value of ‘believes’ is also the same, meaning that Lois is related to that one 
proposition in the same way in both cases. We can even conceive of a situation where 
(2) and (3) are both true at the same time. However, the truth value of the object of 
Lois’s belief changes. Since the object of her belief doesn’t change, this contradicts 
(T
3
). It seems, therefore, that the two truth-condition schemas that the propositionalist 
has proposed for propositional attitude reports, cannot be consistently held. 
Of course, propositionalism has suffered from problems before, and as before, it might 
be that a way around this one will be found as well.
11
 I do not, however, think that it is 
worth the effort. The rest of this section is dedicated to undermining the motivation for 
saving propositionalism. 
 
4.2. Objections to the necessity of propositionalism 
 
The motivation for adopting propositionalism (see 3.3) was that it is evident on the basis 
of linguistic analysis that i) the truth value of a propositional attitude report must 
                                                 
11
 Propositionalist responses include, for example, indexical and non-indexical contextualism. The former 
relativizes semantic values and the latter relativizes alethic values of all expressions to various parameters 
of an occasion of utterance. For an overview of both and criticism of the former, see MacFarlane 2007. 
For Travis’s criticism, see Travis 1978. One might also argue that my treatment of ‘is flying’ in the 
thought-experiment as having the same semantic value on both occasions is not warranted ‒ that semantic 
values are actually more finely individuated. For a reply to this kind of objections, see Travis 2008b. 
24 
 
depend on whether or not the individual whose attitude is reported is related in the right 
way to a certain kind of object, ii) this object must be treated as truth-apt, and iii) it 
cannot have as constituents any of the syntactic elements of the subclause of the attitude 
report. If there is a way to get around these claims, or at least some of them, then the 
need for accepting propositionalism disappears, and options for alternatives open up. 
I will now show for claims (ii) and (iii) how we can avoid accepting them. I will be 
discussing claim (i) in some detail in the next section. 
 
4.2.1. Avoiding the truth-aptness assumption 
 
The assumption that at least some propositional attitudes, like beliefs for example, are 
truth-apt, is probably considered to be the most uncontroversial assumption of 
propositionalism. Even if one is sceptical about propositions, the following 
biconditional is still usually accepted: the belief is true if, and only if the subclause of 
the belief report is true. There is a small problem with this. 
The cases that the propositionalist takes to be evidence for the truth-aptness of beliefs, 
are not ‒ at least on the face of it ‒ cases of evaluating propositions (or subclauses). 
Instead, it seems that we are evaluating the subject, or perhaps the state the subject is in 
(the believing, not the belief). Take the following cases for example: ‘Lois falsely 
believes that Superman is not Clark Kent’, ‘Mary is right in believing that someone’s 
been stealing her cigarettes’, ‘Smith believes that Jones gets the job, but he is 
mistaken/wrong’. Compare this now with the way the propositionalist talks about 
beliefs: ‘Lois’s belief that Superman is not Clark Kent, is false’, ‘that what Mary 
believes, is true’, ‘Smith believes the false proposition that Jones gets the job’. It seems 
that the propositionalist may have misunderstood the empirical data before her. This 
would explain why the propositionalist must always help herself to rather technical 
paraphrases in order to accommodate something into her theory that was originally 
meant to be the evidence for it. 
The problem becomes more sever when we take seriously the following remark by 
Lynne Rudder Baker: „The root idea of belief is of believing. Believing that snow is 
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white is a property; the term ‘belief’ is just a nominalization of ‘believing’.“ (Baker 
2003: 185) 
I will expand upon this idea a little. Believing and having a belief are mutually 
exclusive ‒ we do not believe beliefs. The same is true of thinking and having thoughts, 
suspecting and having suspicions, and so forth. So, we have to go either for the one or 
the other. Baker claims that the proper way of speaking is to use the verb form. I agree 
(at least in Estonian, the noun forms occur very rarely outside of philosophy). The 
propositionalist, however, is forced to claim that the proper form is really the noun 
form. The verb form can always be paraphrased into the noun form, but only the noun 
form allows explicating truth values properly ‒ the true essence of believing is 
uncovered only after we recognize that believing is really having beliefs. I find this 
argumentation question-begging. However, even if one isn’t disturbed by this, if an 
alternative way of accounting for the apparent truth-aptness of the objects of 
propositional attitudes were available, the propositionalist could no longer say that these 
objects must be propositions. 
Here’s one such alternative. I will follow Baker in that there are no beliefs, only 
believing. Instead of saying that correctly believing and incorrectly believing are really 
having a true belief and having a false belief, respectively, like the propositionalist does, 
I will say that they are both special kinds of believing. This way the need for assigning 
truth values to objects of beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) is eliminated. What 
the propositionalist is trying to say with ‘Mary believes that someone’s been stealing 
her cigarettes, and her belief is true/false’ I am saying with ‘Mary correctly/incorrectly 
believes that someone’s been stealing her cigarettes’12. 
 
4.2.2. Avoiding the no-syntax-of-the-subclause requirement 
 
To have a propositional attitude is to instantiate a mental property. What must be noted 
about the claim that the objects of attitudes (or more precisely, the alethic values of the 
                                                 
12
 I chose the terms ‘correctly’ and ‘incorrectly’ for the explicit negation in the latter. I am not claiming 
that these terms can be used in all circumstances and alongside every propositional attitude verb. In cases 
where they don’t apply or where they convey different meaning, I suggest paraphrasing. 
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subclauses) cannot have as constituents any of the syntactic elements of the subclauses, 
depends on the theory of mind that one presupposes in one’s treatment of propositional 
attitude reports. 
The no-syntax-of-the-subclause requirement must be assumed only if we adopt a theory 
of mind according to which the access to propositional attitudes is privileged to those 
who have them.
13
 On this view, when others report my attitudes, they are trying to 
predict which objects I am personally related to in my mind. If, while holding this view, 
we postulated syntactic elements of the subclause as constituents of the object of the 
attitude, then we’d be forced to conclude that no propositional attitude report expressed 
in, say, Spanish could be true about me. This is because I, as someone who doesn’t 
understand a word of Spanish, would simply not be related to any objects with Spanish 
syntax in my mind. 
However, theories that take mental properties to be privileged in this way, are not the 
only ones available. I will now give a brief overview of a theory that allows us to give 
up on the no-syntax-of-the-subclause requirement, namely interpretivism. The brand of 
interpretivism that I suggest here is the ascription theory as defended by Bruno Mölder 
(2010). My reason for choosing this particular brand is that it explicitly remains neutral 
with respect to the question of alethic values of subclauses, and (as a bonus) the 
ascription theory and Travis’s position seem to be fully compatible. The theory can be 
summed up as follows: 
There is no deeper reality to having a belief than having it ascribed in accordance with 
certain conditions. /---/ [M]ental terms are applicable in virtue of us sharing a folk-
psychological conception that determines which sort of mental states are required in order 
for us to make sense of given behaviour in a given environment. (Mölder 2010: 149) 
An ascription of an attitude that conforms with these conditions (a canonical ascription) 
is constitutive for the attitude. The conditions that an ascription must meet, in order to 
be canonical, include coherence with various data sources, which include what other 
mental states are ascribable to the subject, facts about her behaviour, environment, and 
personal background. Also, no warranted objections or actual defeaters to the ascription 
must be present. 
                                                 
13
 Theories of this kind include dualism, functionalism, and identity theory. For an overview of these 
theories and arguments against them, see Mölder 2010: ch 2. 
27 
 
Notice that there is no requirement that the ascriber must share a language with the 
subject. Nor does the ascriber need to be able to put herself „in the shoes“ of the subject. 
„[I]t is not required that the subject of the ascription herself needs to agree with the 
ascription. There is no absolute first-person authority.“ (Mölder 2010: 174) This seems 
to be assumed also by Travis when he claims that „[i]n a belief ascription, we are, as it 
were, fitting the believer into our picture of the world, not fitting ourselves behind his 
‘window of it’“ (Travis 2008a: 197‒198). 
In the light of this, we can say that under the right conditions, if I ascribe to myself and 
my cat the belief that someone’s at the door, then she and I share a belief, even though 
we do not share a language. This belief ‒ the object we are both related to ‒ can include 
syntax insofar as it is the syntax familiar to the ascriber, i.e. me. In Travisian terms, I’m 
fitting my cat into my picture of the world. If I need language to do it, I will use the 
language I know. Going back to the propositional attitude reports in Spanish, if a native 
speaker of Spanish ascribes a propositional attitude to me, and this ascription meets the 
conditions of canonicality, then I will have that attitude irrespective of my lack of the 
ability to understand Spanish. Thus we have a theory of mind that allows us to drop the 
no-syntax-of-subclauses requirement. 
What this means is that a variety of alternative theories about propositional attitude 
reports become available, including, e.g., sententialism. Sententialism is the view that 
objects of attitudes are not the meanings of the relevant subclauses, but the subclauses 
themselves.
14
 The no-syntax-of-subclauses requirement has been the main motivation 
for rejecting this view. (McKay, Nelson 2010) 
The ascription theory also allows for the occasion-sensitivity of which ascriptions count 
as canonical, and thus which attitudes the subject of the ascription has on a given 
occasion. 
As any ascription is done in a particular setting, the features of that situation determine 
what sort of information is relevant and which revisions may be needed. (Mölder 2010: 
174) 
                                                 
14
 One proponent of sententialism has been, for example, Quine (1956). 
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This makes the ascription theory compatible with Travis’s position introduced in the 
beginning of this section, namely that what the subject counts as believing, suspecting, 
hoping, etc, depends on the occasion of utterance of the propositional attitude report. 
In this section I first provided a direct objection to propositionalism, that I borrowed 
from Charles Travis. I showed that the truth-condition schemas that the propositionalist 
proposes for propositional attitude reports run into contradiction when occasion-
sensitivity of propositional attitude reports comes into the picture. After this I presented 
a way out of two of the assumptions that have led philosophers into accepting 
propositionalism. In the next section I am proposing an outline of an alternative to 
propositionalism that makes use of the ideas introduced in this one. 
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5. THE MODEL THEORY OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 
 
In this section I will introduce my alternative to the propositionalist truth-condition 
schemas for propositional attitude reports. I will first explain what the theory is about, 
and then develop its outline in more detail. This will be done in 5.1 and 5.2. In 5.3 I will 
give an argument for the support of my theory, and in 5.4 I will look at two possible 
objections to it. 
 
5.1. Models as objects of propositional attitudes 
 
The propositionalist proposal was that objects of propositional attitudes, or more 
precisely, the alethic values of subclauses of propositional attitude reports, are 
propositions ‒ the semantic values of the subclauses. As I showed in the previous 
section, this proposal has problems and the reasons for adopting this view could be 
bypassed. What I propose as an alternative, is that objects of propositional attitudes are 
models. I will refer to this theory as the model theory of propositional attitudes. 
When I propose that objects of attitudes are models, I am not claiming that we believe 
models (nor do we suspect or think them), we believe, for example, that Mr Smith will 
get the job or what we can see or everything Mary told John. These expressions may 
well be about propositions. We must distinguish between what the subject believes, 
suspects, hopes, etc, and the object of her attitude ‒ the thing she must be related to in 
order for a given propositional attitude report to be true about her. The former is what is 
expressed by the subclause, the latter is what the subclause contributes to the truth-value 
of the report. The idea that propositional attitude reports express relations between 
individuals and propositions, is not incompatible with the model theory. What the 
model theory rejects is that the alethic value of the subclause is a proposition, and 
consequently, it rejects the truth-condition schemas that the propositionalist proposes 
for propositional attitude reports. 
Before moving on to specifics, two things should be noticed. First, models are not truth-
bearing entities. So, objects of propositional attitudes, according to the model theory, 
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are not truth-apt. But as I showed in the previous section, there is a simple way to get 
around this. I will make use of it in what follows. Second, models have syntactic 
constituents ‒ they interpret atomic expressions of a language. Again, as I showed in the 
previous section, this is not a problem if one adopts interpretivism. The form of 
interpretivism I introduced, namely the ascription theory, is the one that I will be 
assuming also in this section. 
 
5.2. An outline of the model theory of propositional attitudes 
 
I will now explain the formal aspects of the model theory of propositional attitudes. 
First, I will quickly go over the notion of a model again, and then introduce the notion 
of a complete model and the submodel relation. I will use these tools to build the set of 
all models for a language, which I will then use to upgrade the language   from section 
2 in order to give a formal account of the truth-condition schemas that I propose for 
propositional attitude reports. 
 
5.2.1. Complete models, submodels, and the model set 
 
A model is a set-theoretic construction that assigns extensions to the atomic expressions 
of a language. Given alethic compositionality, sentences (insofar as they are complex 
expressions) have alethic values relative to a model (or: in a model). An  -model is an 
ordered pair of the form      , where   is a domain ‒ a non-empty set, and   is an 
interpretation function ‒ a function that assigns an extension to every atomic expression 
of  . These extensions were taken from the domain. 
The interpretation function of an model can be thought of as a set of ordered pairs       
where   is an atomic expression, and   is an extension. So, models have syntactic 
constituents, namely the atomic expressions of the language for which the model is 
defined. We can make this salient by writing out  -models not as ordered pairs but as 
ordered triplets of the following sort:        , where   and   are as before, and   is a 
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set of atomic expressions of   for which the function   delivers an output. Notice that 
we haven’t introduced anything new ‒   has been a hidden component of the model all 
along. 
We can now see all the possible ways two models could differ from one another ‒ they 
can differ with respect to the number and kind of elements in  ,  , and  . What kind of 
elements   has, depends on what kind of elements   and   have, but is not determined 
by it ‒ it is still open which extensions are assigned to which elements of  . 
Ordinarily, a model is taken to be complete. A model is complete if, and only if   has all 
the atomic expressions of a language as elements. One complete  -model assigns an 
extension to each atomic expression of  , but there is a variety of complete  -models ‒ 
models that each assign an extension to every atomic expression of  , but nevertheless 
differ from one another. Complete  -models that use the same domain, can differ with 
respect to which elements or sets of elements of the domain the interpretation function 
assigns to atomic expressions. Even more varieties open up, if different domains are 
used as well. 
For every model, there are one or more submodels of that model. The submodel relation 
is subject to the following constraints: for any two models           and    
          ,    is a submodel of   iff i)     , ii)     , iii) if   is a predicate in   , 
then           , and iv) if   is a name in   , then           . Let ‘    ’ be 
short for ‘   is a submodel of ’. 
Two things are worth noting about the submodel relation. First, every model is a 
submodel of itself, and second, if     , then any sentence that is true in   , is also 
true in . 
Now, since every model is a submodel of itself, the set of all submodels of complete  -
models is the set of all  -models. Let  be that set. There is a set of this kind for every 
language. I will refer to the set  of a language as the model set of that language. The 
model set of a language contains all possible models of the language, complete or 
otherwise. 
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5.2.2. The language    
 
The language    can now be defined. It is just like the language   I defined in section 
2, except it includes propositional attitude verbs and a logical operator ‘ ’ that attaches 
to propositional attitude verbs, forming a new predicate, and reads ‘correctly’ (or 
something similar, like ‘unmistakenly’). I will not introduce a negation operator, but if I 
did, the predicate ‘correctly believes’ in the scope of a de re negation would read 
‘incorrectly believes’ (or ‘mistakenly believes’ or ‘falsely believes’, or something 
similar). 
Grammar rules of    
(i) Every sentence of   is a sentence of   . 
(ii) If   is a name,   is a propositional attitude verb, and   is a sentence of   , then       
and        are sentences of   . 
(iii) Nothing else is a sentence of   . 
A model  for    
        , where   is the model set of   ,   is a non-empty set, and   is an 
interpretation function that is just like the interpretation function of an  -model, except for 
the following addition: 
(iv) if   is a propositional attitude verb, then         . 
The valuation function    for    
   is a function, relative to an   -model  , that is just like the  -valuation function, 
except for the following addition: 
(v) if   is a name,   is a propositional attitude verb, and   is a sentence of   , then 
 (T
5
)          true iff               , such that         true 
 (T
6
)           true iff               , such that         true, and    . 
The truth-condition schemas (T
5
) and (T
6
) are what I propose as an alternative to the 
propositionalist’s proposal. (T5) is the truth-condition schema for propositional attitude 
reports, and (T
6
) is for accounting for the evaluation of propositional attitudes. What the 
 -operator adds to the truth-conditions of the propositional attitude report is that the 
model adopted for the subject of ascription is a submodel of the model in which the 
report is evaluated. I will refer to the former as the inner model, and the latter as the 
outer model. 
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5.3. Belief ascriptions as model adoptions 
 
An argument can be given for the claim that adopting a model for a subject entails 
ascribing a propositional attitude to her. I will assume that we adopt models with the 
help of words ‒ we have to say something in order to do it. 
It seems that i) saying that   takes the sentence   to be true, is sufficient for ascribing 
the belief that   to  . For example, if we say (in some circumstance) that Lois takes 
‘Superman was seen flying over Metropolis’ to be true, then we are ascribing the belief 
to Lois that Superman was seen flying over Metropolis. This ascription may be 
uncanonical, but it would nevertheless be an ascription. 
Truth, however, is always truth in a model. So, adopting a model for   in which   is 
true, is necessary for saying that   takes the sentence   to be true. Furthermore, we may 
say that it is also sufficient for it. In other words, ii) when we adopt a model for   in 
which   is true (by producing some sort of words in order to do it), then we are already 
saying that   takes the sentence   to be true. 
Therefore (from (i) and (ii)), adopting a model for   in which   is true, is sufficient for 
ascribing the belief that   to  . For a parsomonious account of propositional attitudes 
we may assume that adopting a model is all there is to ascribing a belief, and 
furthermore, that it is all there is to ascribing any propositional attitude. 
 
5.4. Possible problems with objectivity 
 
There are two problems that can be raised for the model theory of propositional attitudes 
(and also for Travis’s position introduced in the previous section), both of which have to 
do with objectivity. First, what determines the inner model ‒ the model adopted for the 
subject, and second, what determines the outer model ‒ the model in which the 
propositional attitude report is evaluated. 
The first problem can be rephrased as a problem of speaker-dependence of propositional 
attitudes. If the object of the propositional attitude is a model which is adopted by the 
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speaker of the propositional attitude report (the ascriber), then what propositional 
attitudes someone has become speaker-dependent. It might be said that this is simply 
too counter-intuitive. As Fodor and Lepore have put it, „if anything is metaphysically 
independent of anything, surely your repertoir of potential beliefs is independent of 
anybody else’s repertoir of potential speech acts“ (Fodor, Lepore 1993: 71). 
It’s possible, however, that this intuition is really grounded in the fear of relativism, not 
of speaker-dependence. If so, then there is no reason for worry. The canonicality 
constraint on ascriptions that was mentioned in the previous section (see 4.2.2 and 
Mölder 2010: 159‒178) eliminates relativism. Mölder writes: 
As interpretivism suggests, the way others come to appreciate one’s mental states also plays 
a role in fixing what states one has. It does not follow, however, that the matter of mental 
state possession thereby becomes relative to the conceptual resources, intellectual level or 
interests of the interpreters. Since the possession is fixed by the canonical ascription, the 
varying standards of different interpreters do not have an effect on possession, if they fail to 
match up to the level of canonical ascribers. (Mölder 2010: 196) 
In principle, we can adopt any model for any subject, but only those models that are 
adopted under the canonicality conditions will count. If a propositional attitude is 
reported while the canonicality conditions are not met, then the resulting statement is 
false. To make this salient, the following constraint must be placed on (T
5
) and (T
6
): the 
inner model must be adopted under the conditions of canonicality. 
The second problem has specifically to do with the truth-condition schema (T
6
). What 
(T
6
) suggests is that the correctness of propositional attitudes of subjects depends on 
which outer model is used. Given that the outer model is adopted by the speaker, the 
correctness of propositional attitudes ends up being speaker-dependent. This seems even 
more counter-intuitive than the first issue ‒ if anything is metaphysically independent of 
anything, surely the truth of your beliefs is independent of anybody elses speech acts. 
The solution to the first problem will not solve the second. If we applied the same 
criteria for what counts as the right outer model (taking the speaker to be the subject), 
then this would only result in the speaker being right about what she takes to be the 
facts ‒ what she belives, suspects, etc. What we need the speaker to be right about is 
what the facts are. 
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I do not have a conclusive answer to this problem yet, but I can give an outline of what 
the answer should consist in. First, as it is with the inner model, the speaker must be 
able to adopt any model as the outer model, but only some of them may count as the 
right ones. This will account for the possibility of error. Second, what counts as the 
right outer model, must be determined to some degree by certain factors of the 
circumstance in which the propositional attitude report is made, and furthermore, 
different factors can be relevant in different circumstances ‒ there cannot be a single 
model for all purposes. This will account for occasion-sensitivity of propositional 
attitude reports (and any other sentence we utter). Third, given that the world itself does 
not determine which is the right way of dividing it up into objects, properties, and 
relations (and therefore cannot settle what is the right model all by itself), something 
like conversational goals must be relevant. 
In this section I introduced my alternative to the propositionalist truth-condition 
schemas. In short, my proposal was to treat the extension of the propositional attitude 
verb as a binary relation over a set of individuals and a set of models, not a set of 
propositions. After explaining the details of how this can be done, I provided an 
argument for the idea that propositional attitude ascriptions (at least ascriptions of 
beliefs) are really adoptions of models for subjects. Finally, I looked at two problems 
that my proposal might be taken to have. In the next section I will compare my 
alternative to the propositionalist proposal, and point out an interesting implication it 
has for epistemology. 
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6. IN COMPARISON WITH PROPOSITIONALISM 
 
The aim of this section is to show that the model theory of propositional attitudes is a 
viable alternative to propositionalism. I will show that it has tools for accounting for 
Travis-type thought-experiments and for solving the problem of opaque attitude 
contexts. After this I will explain why the entailment from the truth of the subclause of a 
true belief report to the correctness of the belief fails in the framework of the model 
theory, and what implications this has for the study of knowledge. 
Throughout this section I will make reference to the truth-condition schemas and the 
submodel relation developed in the previous section. For readability, I will write them 
out here as well. 
If   is a name,   is a propositional attitude verb, and   is a sentence of   , then 
 (T
5
)          true iff               , such that         true 
 (T
6
)           true iff               , such that         true, and    . 
For any           and              :      iff i)     ; ii)     ; iii) if   is a 
predicate in   , then           ; iv) if   is a name in   , then           . 
 
6.1. Compatibility with Travis’s position 
 
The propositionalist and I can both agree that the semantic properties of the subclause of 
the propositional attitude report pick out a proposition. In the propositionalist truth-
condition schema, however, that proposition was then treated as the alethic value of the 
subclause. This was the reason why it was vulnerable to Travis-type thought-
experiments. The model theory does not use the proposition as an alethic value. Instead, 
it introduces models for this. Therefore, it should be able to handle Travis-type thought 
experiments. I will now show how it does that. 
Take the thought-experiment from the previous section. (I will make the relevant 
modifications in order to analyse it in the light of the model theory.) On one occasion, 
the following sentence was true: 
 (1) Lois incorrectly believes that Clark Kent is flying. 
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On another occasion, the following sentence was true: 
 (2) Lois correctly believes that Clark Kent is flying. 
There was no change in the world with respect to what Clark Kent was doing, the 
subclause ‘Clark Kent is flying’ expressed the same proposition on both occasions, and 
yet, Lois was mistaken on the first occasion, while on the second occasion she was not. 
There are two alternative ways to account for this in the framework of the model theory. 
We either take the outer models on each occasion to be different, or we take them to be 
the same. In the former case it is us for whom different activities count as flying. What 
counts as flying for Lois, will be irrelevant. In the latter case it is only Lois for whom 
different activites count as flying, and we must decide beforehand what counts as flying 
for us on both occasions. The second option is the more interesting one, so I will only 
look at that one. 
Let’s keep the outer model the same for both (1) and (2), and only count flying with the 
help of a plane as flying. The interpretation function of the outer model will then assign 
‘is flying’ a set that includes the individual Clark Kent as an element, along with other 
passengers and, presumably, a pilot or two.
15
 
Assume that the sentence ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying’ is true on both 
occasions. This, together with the truth-condition schema (T
5
), entails that there is a 
model adopted for Lois on both occasion ‒ an inner model for (1) and an inner model 
for (2). The sentence ‘Clark Kent is flying’ is true in both models. This in turn means 
that the interpretation function of both models assigns a set of elements to ‘is flying’ 
that includes the individual Clark Kent as an element. 
On the first occasion, however, what counts as flying for Lois is the kind of flying that 
is done without the help of a plane, so in addition to the individual Clark Kent, the 
extension of ‘is flying’ includes, say, some birds and planes (we, insofar as we are 
canonical ascribers, are the judges of that). Given that the extension of ‘is flying’ in the 
inner model is not a subset of the extension of ‘is flying’ in the outer model, the inner 
                                                 
15
 If intensional models were used, namely models where expressions get assigned functions from 
possible worlds to extensions, then we wouldn’t need to introduce extra elements into the extension of ‘is 
flying’. The reason we need to do it now, is that we need to avoid accidental co-extensionality. 
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model is not a submodel of the outer model. From this and the truth-condition schema 
(T
6
) (and the law of non-contradiction), it follows that (1) is true. 
On the second occasion, what Lois counts as flying is the same as what we ourselves 
count as flying, so the interpretation function of the inner model we adopt for Lois when 
uttering (2), assigns ‘is flying’ the same extension as the interpretation function of the 
outer model does. The submodel relation is therefore not violated, and, given (T
6
), the 
sentence (2) is true. 
I have now shown that (1) and (2) can both be given consistent readings in the 
framework of the model theory. Therefore, the theory is compatible with Travis’s 
position. 
 
6.2. Solution to the problem of opaque attitude contexts 
 
Let’s look at the problem of opaque attitude contexts. The problem was that intuitively, 
(3) and (4) can be true while (5) is false, but if we accepted that, then it would be a 
violation of the principle of alethic substitutivity which in turn would be a violation of 
the principle of alethic compositionality. The latter was needed to explain the linguistic 
competence of speakers. 
 (3) Lois believes that Superman is flying. 
 (4) Superman   Clark Kent 
 (5) Lois believes that Clark Kent is flying. 
As with explaining the Travis-type thought-experiment, there are again two ways of 
showing that the sentences are compatible. We can let the outer model vary, or we can 
use one and the same outer model for all three sentences. Again, since the second option 
is the more challenging one, let’s use one and the same outer model. This model will be 
the one in which (3) and (4) are true, and (5) is false. Given that (3) is true, there is a 
model adopted for Lois in which ‘Superman is flying’ is true. Given that (5) is false, 
there are no models adopted for Lois in which ‘Clark Kent is flying’ is true. These two 
results are compatible because the model in which ‘Superman is flying’ is true, can be 
such that the name ‘Clark Kent’ gets no interpretation in it. Remember, models can vary 
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with respect to the number of elements in the set of all atomic expressions interpreted in 
them. What the truth of (4) entails is that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ have the same 
extension in the outer model. This is compatible with ‘Clark Kent’ not getting an 
interpretation in the model adopted for Lois. So, all three claims are compatible. At the 
same time, the truth-condition schemas (T
5
) and (T
6
) guarantee that alethic 
compositionality is preserved. (The solution for the problem with substituting co-
extensional predicates is similar to this.) 
We should now see whether or not we can still count Lois as being right, given (T
6
). 
Let’s substitute (3) with (6). 
 (6) Lois correctly believes that Superman is flying. 
The model we adopted for Lois has the expressions ‘is flying’ and ‘Superman’ as 
members of the set of atomic expressions. The model we have as the outer model has 
‘Clark Kent’, ‘believes’, and ‘Lois’ in addition to these two. So, the set of atomic 
expressions of the inner model is a subset of the set of atomic expressions of the outer 
model. Also, the domain of the inner model must include only one element, namely the 
individual Clark Kent. The outer model has it as an element as well. Finally, the 
extension of ‘is flying’ in the inner model has no elements that the extension of ‘is 
flying’ in the outer model doesn’t. Therefore, no constraint on the submodel relation is 
violated ‒ the model adopted for Lois „fits into“ the outer model. Thus, according to 
(T
6
), (6) is true. 
I have now shown how the problem of opaque attitude contexts is solved by the model 
theory of propositional attitudes. This alone should put it on a par with 
propositionalism, but as I showed above, it doesn’t have difficulties with Travis-type 
thought-experiments either. 
 
6.3. No entailment from the truth of the subclause to the correctness of the belief 
 
Given the constraint on the interpretation function for propositional attitude verbs (see 
5.2.2), the way propositional attitudes are individuated in the framework of the model 
theory differs from how they are individuated in the propositionalist framework. For 
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each model that is (canonically) adopted, there corresponds one propositional attitude. 
This means that many different propositional attitude reports can be true because of one 
ascription. E.g. when ‘Lois believes that Superman is flying’ is true, then Lois has one 
belief. This one belief is sufficient for also the sentences ‘Lois believes that someone is 
flying’, ‘Lois believes that Superman exists’, and ‘Lois believes that not everyone is not 
flying’ to be true, and more. This is a big difference comparing to how the 
propositionalist is forced to individuate beliefs, namely she has to postulate a different 
belief for every subclause of a true propositional attitude report. The reason that the 
propositionalist has to do this, is that, given her framework, objects of propositional 
attitudes are individuated in terms of what the subclauses express. The subclauses of 
‘Lois believes that Superman is flying’ and ‘Lois believes that not everyone is not 
flying’ express different propositions. 
A consequence of individuating propositional attitudes differently is that the entailment 
from the truth of the suclause of the propositional attitude report to the correctness of 
the propositional attitude (like belief) fails. Consider the reverse entailment first. 
 (i) If   correctly believes that  , then   is true. 
Entailment (i) holds in the framework of the model theory. This is because, given (T
6
), 
if the antecedent ‘  correctly believes that  ’ is true, then   is true in the inner model, 
and the inner model is a submodel of the outer model. Any sentence that is true in the 
submodel, is true in the supermodel. Therefore, the truth of the consequent of (i), 
namely  , is guaranteed by the antecedent. Now consider (ii). 
 (ii) If  , and   believes that  , then   correctly believes that  . 
The truth of the second conjunct ‘  believes that  ’ guarantees that there is a model 
adopted for   in which   is true. The truth of the first conjunct, namely  , guarantees 
that   is also true in the outer model. However, there can be two models in which   is 
true without the models standing in the submodel relation to one another. E.g. ‘there is a 
bottle of water on my desk’ could be true in two models, one with an interpretation 
function that assigns ‘water’ the kind of liquid you can find in Emajõgi, and another 
with an interpretation function that assigns it pure    . This makes the interpretation 
functions incompatible, and therefore, also the two models cannot stand in a submodel 
relation to one another. So, it could be that there is a bottle of water on my desk, and 
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that Mary believes that there is a bottle of water on my desk, but Mary can still be 
wrong. 
 
6.4. Exposing pseudo Gettier cases 
 
An interesting consequence of the failure of entailment (ii), is that some of the Gettier-
type counterexamples to some theories of knowledge turn out to be pseudo 
counterexamples. Suprisingly, the most famous ones that turn out to be pseudo 
counterexamples are the two provided by Gettier (1963) himself. They are directed 
against the theory that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). I will go through both 
cases. 
The first thought experiment that Gettier provides is the following. Suppose that Smith 
and Jones are applying for the same job, and that Smith is justified in believing the 
following statement: 
 (8) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his 
  pocket. 
From (8), Smith deduces the following statement: 
 (9) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
But as it turns out, Smith himself, against all odds, gets the job and discovers that he too 
has ten coins in his pocket. Gettier then concludes that Smith has a justified true belief 
that (9), but does not know that (9). (Gettier 1963: 122) 
According to the model theory of propositional attitudes, Smith’s belief is not true, or 
more precisely, he does not correctly believe that (9). In the example, Gettier jumps 
from the truth of the subclause to the correctness of the belief. This inference, as I 
showed, is invalid. We must check whether or not the model adopted for Smith (the 
inner model) is a submodel of the model in which the belief report ‘Smith believes that 
the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket’ is evaluated (the outer model). 
As it turns out, the interpretation function of the latter assigns the set  Smith  as the 
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extension of ‘will get the job’, while the interpretation function of the former assigns it 
the set  Jones , thus violating the submodel relation, making Smith’s belief incorrect. 
In the other case that Gettier presents, Smith is justified in believing that 
 (10) Jones owns a Ford. 
Smith then deduces, among other statements, that 
 (11) either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. 
It turns out that Jones does not own a Ford, but Brown is in Barcelona. According to 
Gettier, Smith now has a justified true belief. (Gettier 1963: 122‒123) 
In the model adopted for Smith, ‘Jones owns a Ford’ is true, while in the model in 
which the attitude report ‘Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in 
Barcelona’ is evaluated, the sentence ‘Jones owns a Ford’ is false. Again, this violates 
the submodel relation, making Smith’s belief incorrect. 
There could of course be genuine counter-examples to JTB, but whether or not there are 
any, is beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, when attempting to provide a 
counterexample to a theory of knowledge while operating in the framework of the 
model theory, one cannot make the jump from the truth of sentences to the correctness 
of beliefs. 
In this section I compared the alternative I developed in the previous section with 
propositionalism ‒ the theory I introduced in section 3 and criticised in section 4. I 
showed that my alternative can easily account for Travis-type thought-experiments that 
the propositionalist has difficulties with. Then I explained how it solves the problem of 
opaque attitude contexts ‒ the problem to which the various schools of propositionalism 
also have their answers. After that, in order to tip the scales in my favour, I showed how 
adopting the theory I developed would bring some new perspective into epistemology. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I showed why propositionalism might not be the best approach to solving 
the problem of opaque attitude contexts, and that alternative approaches are not only 
possible but available. I explained the origin and nature of the problem of opaque 
attitude contexts in section 2. In short, the problem is the following. In order to explain 
certain aspects of linguistic competence, we must assume that expressions with the 
same alethic value should be substitutable in declarative sentences without affecting the 
truth value of the sentence. However, when an expression is within an attitude context, 
this substitution seems to fail. 
Propositionalism has been the mainstream strategy for solving the problem. According 
to propositionalism, a propositional attitude report is true just in case the subject of the 
report stands in a certain relation to the proposition expressed by the subclause of the 
report. The proposition expressed by the subclause is therefore taken to be not only its 
semantic value, but also its alethic value. I gave an overview of propositionalism and 
the two main forms it comes in, in section 3. 
In section 4 I introduced a direct objection to propositionalism, that has been developed 
by Charles Travis. The objection stems from the propositionalist assumption that 
semantic values can fix alethic values. I also showed how re-phrasing noun forms like 
‘belief’, ‘suspicion’, ‘thought’, etc, into verb forms like ‘believing’, ‘suspecting’, 
‘thinking’, etc, respectively, can help us avoid accepting the need to consider 
propositionalism, and how accepting an interpretivist theory of mind opens up new 
alternatives for solving the problem of opaque attitude contexts. 
After that I presented an alternative to the propositionalist proposal, which I referred to 
as the model theory of propositional attitudes. According to the model theory, a 
propositional attitude report is true just in case the subject of the report stands in a 
certain relation to a model in which the subclause is true. Developing the details and 
accounting for possible objections to this theory was the topic of section 5. 
In section 6 I compared the model theory with propositionalism, showing that it solves 
the problem of opaque attitude contexts without being vulnerable to Travis’s objection. 
I also showed that, after we adopt the model theory, some Gettier-type counterexamples 
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to theories of knowledge turn out to be pseudo counterexamples. Perhaps this will bring 
some new perspective to epistemology and the study of knowledge in particular. 
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RESÜMEE 
 
Seletamaks kõnelejate keelelist kompetentsi, on vaja eeldada, et väitlausete tõeväärtused 
on determineeritud kompositsionaalselt. Väitlause tõeväärtus saab sõltuda ainult tema 
osade panusest tõeväärtusele ja viisist, kuidas need osad väitlauseks kombineeritud on. 
Mida see eeldus endaga kaasa toob, on ennustus, et vahetades ühe lauseosa teisega, 
mille panus tõeväärtusele on sama, jääb lause tõeväärtus muutumatuks. 
Üheks probleemiks sellele on väitlaused, mis raporteerivad hoiakuid, nagu uskumused, 
kahtlused, arvamused, jne. Toon näite. Tundub, et lausete ‘Lois usub, et Superman 
lendab’ ja ‘Lois usub, et Clark Kent lendab’ tõeväärtused võivad erineda, isegi kui 
‘Superman on Clark Kent’ on tõene. 
Paradigmaatiline strateegia selle probleemi lahendamisel on olnud kõrvallause osade 
tähenduste kohtlemine panustena kogulause tõeväärtusele. Nimetan sellist strateegiat 
propositsionalismiks. Näiteks on propositsionalismi järgi lause ‘Lois usub, et Superman 
lendab, ja tal on õigus’ tõene siis, ja ainult siis, kui väljendi ‘Lois’ panus tõeväärtusele, 
on sobivas relatsioonis lause ‘Superman lendab’ tähendusega ‒ propositsiooniga, mida 
see väljendab ‒, ning see propositsioon on tõene. 
Oletused, mis propositsionalismini on viinud, on, i) et hoiakute objekte tuleb kohelda 
kui tõeväärtuse kandjaid, ning et ii) neil objektidel ei saa olla süntaktilisi osi, kuna üht 
keelt kõneleva subjekti hoiakuid on võimalik raporteerida mõnes teises keeles. Eeldus, 
mida propositsionalist on seejuures sunnitud tegema, on, et fikseerides lause tähenduse, 
fikseerime ka tõeväärtuse. Viimane on aga problemaatiline. Näiteks võib lause ‘lehed 
minu puul on rohelised’ olla tõene olukorras, kus olen just lehed oma puul roheliseks 
värvinud, aga väär olukorras, kus pakun neid samu lehti botaanikule uurimiseks. 
Mõlemal juhul ütleb lause aga üht ja sama, nimelt seda, et lehed minu puul on rohelised. 
Et avada võimalusi alternatiivseteks strateegiateks hoiakuraportite probleemi 
lahendamisel, tuleb leida viis, kuidas mööda pääseda oletustest, mis 
propositsionalismini viivad. Esimesest oletusest saame mööda, koheldes uskumist (ja 
teisi hoiakuid) omadusena, ning tõeselt ning vääralt uskumist selle omaduse 
eriliikidena. Teisest oletusest saame mööda, võttes omaks vaimuteooria, mis ei anna 
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hoiaku subjektile privileegi otsustamaks, milline on objekt, millega ta vastavas 
relatsioonis on. Selliseks teooriaks on näiteks interpretivism.  
Alternatiiviks, mille propositsionalismi asemele välja pakun, on, et hoiakute objektid on 
mudelid. Mudelid on hulgateoreetilised objektid, mis lause osadele väärtuseid 
määravad, mis seejärel on panusteks, mida vastavad lauseosad tõeväärtusele annavad. 
Igasugune tõeväärtus on tõeväärtus mudelis. 
Strateegia, mille välja pakun, on analüüsida hoiakuraporteid järgmiselt. ‘Lois usub, et 
Superman lendab, ja tal on õigus’ on tõene siis, ja ainult siis, kui väljendi ‘Lois’ panus 
tõeväärtusele on sobivas relatsioonis mudeliga, milles ‘Superman lendab’ on tõene, ning 
see mudel on alam-mudeliks mudelile, milles hoiakuraport (analüüsitava konjunktsiooni 
esimene pool) on tõene. Üks mudel on alam-mudeliks teisele parajasti siis, kui hulgad, 
millest esimene koosneb, on alam-hulkadeks hulkadele, millest teine koosneb. 
See alternatiiv suudab hoiakuraportite probleemi lahendada, arvestades samas sellega, et 
tähendus ei fikseeri tõde. Samatähenduslike lausete jaoks võib kasutada erinevaid 
mudeleid. Üheks tagajärjeks, mis sellise strateegia omaks võtmisel on, on see, et 
hoiakud on individueeritud uut moodi. Näiteks võib leiduda olukordi, kus laused ‘Lois 
usub, et Superman lendab’ ja ‘Lois usub, et leidub keegi, kes lendab’ omistavad Loisele 
vaid ühe uskumuse. Propositsionalist on aga sunnitud ütlema, et see ei ole võimalik ‒ 
vastavate osalausete tähendused on igal juhul erinevad. 
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